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In this paper we discuss money demand in the Netherlands over the period 1979-
1999. The model it with a VAR integrated of order two and use full maximum
likelihood for inference of testing. We ﬁnd a stable money demand function over
the period considered. It depends on the short term interest rate available to private
investors, not the rate in the money market.
1 Introduction
The introduction1 of the Euro in 12 of the 15 members of the European Union, has led
to a large debate, scholarly, political and popular, on the costs and beneﬁts of a monetary
union. Discussion still takes place on the costs and beneﬁts of joining for the three old
EU members, that have so far stayed out, and the ten new members, who will join the
EU in 2004. The most frequently cited cost is probably the inability to react differently
to asymmetric shocks. Different transmission mechanisms in the different countries are
a second source of asymmetry: due to institutional differences, like a prevalence of ﬁxed
rate mortgages (the Netherlands) or ﬂoating rate mortgages (the UK) and differences in
structural parameters of the economy can cause a monetary intervention to have different
effects even to economies hit by exactly the same shock.
TheNetherlandshasinthelastfewyearsoftenbeenpraisedforitseconomicsuccesses
of the last two decades: a rapidly declining unemployment rate, increasing participation
rate and a massive public deﬁcit, which had turned into a small surplus before the lat-
est economic slowdown. This success took place, while the Netherlands had a de facto
monetary union with Germany, by far its most important trade partner. The Dutch cen-
tral bank had rendered control of its monetary polity to the German Bundesbank. Within
the Euro-area, countries relinquish virtually all their monetary autonomy to the European
Central Bank in exchange for a very small say in the actual running of monetary policy.
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1I am grateful to Katarina Juselius for her help and patience in the econometric modelling of the data.
She is not responsible for any errors or policy statements.
Gijs de Bruin (postbank), Annelies van Rhenen (spaarbeleg), IJda Geerts (NVM), Dhr. Elferich (De
Nederlandsche Bank) kindly provided data for this paper.
1Studying Dutch money demand and monetary transmission mechanism may therefore
provide a valuable insight in this success story and provide understanding as to how a
monetary union can work or fail, a question which is still relevant.
In the next section, the Dutch macro-economic and political situation are described
together with the monetary policy pursued in the period under study, 1979 1st quarter
until 1998, 4th quarter, when the Euro was introduced. From 1999 there are no publicly
available statistics on the money supply in the individual countries inside the Euro area,
such that the study cannot be extended.
Then follows section 3 with a short overview of the literature and a description of the
data. Section 4 contains an overview of the relevant economic literature. In section 5 we
discuss the I(2) and I(1) methodology, the nominal to real transformation and automated
model selection as well as small sample properties of the estimators used. The analysis
of the Dutch data follows in section 6 before ﬁnal conclusions are drawn.
A technical result concerning bootstrapping linear within equation restrictions in the
cointegration space is given in section A.
Throughout this paper we shall argue that the bootstrap (of tests on the cointegration
parameters) should be based on the unrestricted estimate. We then need to ﬁnd alternative
null hypotheses for the bootstrap samples. In the appendix to this paper an alternative null
hypothesis for linear restrictions within each cointegration vector is given.
2 The Netherlands
In this long section we given an overview of the economic and political situation in the
Netherlands in the period we study. We then proceed with stating the monetary objectives,
the instruments that were used to achieve them and the exchange rate policy followed.
Then follows a short account of the liberalization process.
2.1 Political and Economic situation
During the second world war, the Netherlands had undergone extensive economic dam-
age. After the war, a policy of national reconstruction was started, strongly led by the
central government, which channelled credit to speciﬁc sectors, set explicit targets for the
number of houses to be built each year, and in agreement with the social partners, im-
plemented a policy of moderate wage increases until 1963. After that year a wage-price
spiral erupted, which was fuelled by the revenue of newly discovered natural gas reserves
in the North of the country. The 1960s and 1970s saw a rapid expansion of the Welfare
State and even the two oil shocks did not immediately hit the Netherlands as hard as it did
other countries: natural gas income provided a rapidly increasing source of income. In
1979 a housing market asset bubble burst and by 1981 the labour share of national income
had risen to over 95%. Unemployment started to rise rapidly as the Netherlands entered
its severest post-war depression in 1982, during which national output fell to 1978 levels,
and unemployment tripled.
From 1977 to 1982, 3 increasingly unstable coalitions governed the Netherlands. Al-
though the social democrats were the big winners of the 1982 general election, a coali-
tion between the Christian Democrats (center) and Conservative Liberals was formed in
November 1982, under prime minister Ruud Lubbers, which was to govern until 1989.
2Under pressure from the government and the unfavourable economic situation, the lead-
ers of the Dutch employers, C. van der Lede and employees, Wim Kok, agreed on the
so-called “Agreement of Wassenaar”, which contained wage restraint, a shorter working
week and redivision of existing jobs. The government itself pledged to reduce the taxation
on labour, once the deﬁcit, which was heading for double digit ﬁgure, would allow so. It
also cut nominal wages in the public sector, beneﬁts and minimum wages and embraced
the market: privatization processes were started, markets were liberalized and the public
sector was gradually sized down.
At the same time, the Netherlands entered the hard ERM in 1983, after an unexpected
devaluation in 1983. All in all, the macroeconomic performance of the Netherlands im-
proved remarkably from the second half of the 1980s onwards, when inﬂation was well
below German levels, the unemployment rate declined as did the deﬁcit of the govern-
ment.
In 1989 a new coalition of the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats, who had
decidedly moved to the center, took over with a promise of a more social policy. The fall
of the German wall and German uniﬁcation provided a positive demand shock, but when
the business cycle swung down, the government, which was still running a deﬁcit, felt
that it was necessary to implement a hugely unpopular austerity package of roughly 3%
of GDP in the ﬁrst few months of 1991. This was accompanied by a large increase in the
current account balance. The package was also necessary in the light of the Maastricht
treaty, which was being drafted by the Dutch government, and contained debt and deﬁcit
criteria, to which the Netherlands would not be able to stick without the package. Further-
more the high nominal and real interest rates on the capital market were aggravating the
problem for a country with a debt/GDP ratio of 80%. The treaty was approved by parlia-
ment, without much discussion and without a popular vote, meaning that the Netherlands
would be in the ﬁrst wave entrants to Euroland.
During the ERM crisis of 1992-93, the Guilder-DM mark parity was never seriously
tested by the market and when the system collapsed the Dutch and German authorities
entered into a bilateral agreement to maintain the old parities. As Belgium and France,
two other important trade partners, also recovered to their old parities quite quickly, the
crisis probably had less of an impact on the Dutch economy than on other European
economies.
A new government of Social Democrats, Conservative Liberals and Liberals super-
seded the old government in 1994 and continued with a socially tinted, neo-liberal eco-
nomicpolicy. TheDutcheconomyﬂourishedmorethanever, asitsofﬁcialunemployment
was the lowest in the Euro-area, and in 1999 the government was able to record its ﬁrst
surplus in 25 years.
2.2 Monetary Policy
The Dutch Bank Law2 of 1948 states that:
“It shall be the task of the Dutch Central Bank to regulate the value of the
Dutch currency in such a way as is most conductive for the prosperity of the
2Bankwet 1948, published in het Staatsblad I-166 on May 14th 1948. Another unofﬁcial translation in
English can be found in the Annual Report of De Nederlandsche Bank over 1948.
3nation and in doing so, to stabilize that value as much as possible.”3
Apparently there are three objectives: a welfare objective, internal price stability and
external, exchangeratestability. Infactthelastpartofthephrasewasaddedbyparliament
to interpret the ﬁrst part, see De Jong (1960). The law already curbed the independence
of the Central Bank with respect to the pre-war law in two important ways: all its shares
were bought by the Dutch state (probably at a price slightly below market value) and an
important new article was added, which stated that the Minister of Finance could give
binding “directions” to the Bank. They have never been given and the article has been
removed from the law in 1998 in preparation for the Monetary Union, but in the frequent
informal meetings between the President of the Bank and the Minister of Finance the
sheer possibility of them gave considerable leverage to the Minister. So the Dutch central
bank was somewhat less independent than the German Bundesbank.
InpracticeDutchmonetarypolicy, oftenreferredtoas“ModerateMonetarism”, aimed
at exchange rate stability, deemed very important for a trading nation, ﬁrst in the Bretton
Woods system, later in the snake, ERM and EMU. A broad liquidity ratio was used as the
key indicator for monetary policy. Whenever money growth was perceived to be too high,
the Dutch monetary authorities hit the break with an over time evolving array of policy
instruments, which will be described below, as will the exchange rate arrangements. A
very complete overview is given in De Greef et al. (1998).
The banks own view is that path of moderate monetarism was a fairly constant one.
Still in the 1970s the Dutch government took recourse to monetary ﬁnancing of its deﬁcit
(1975-1983), inﬂation was high and the Dutch currency was devalued several times, so in
fact an expansionary Keynesian policy was followed between 1972 and 1983. Before and
after that period, moderate monetarism is an adequate description of monetary policy.
In 1998 a new bank law superseded the old one, in preparation for monetary union.
Under the new law, price stability is the main objective and as long as that is not endan-
gered, contributing to reaching the goals of article 2 of the treaty of Rome. The right of
the Minister of Finance to overrule the Bank was abolished.
2.3 Liquidity ratio and monetary instruments
From the 1970s onwards, the liquidity ratio was the key variable watched by the Central
Bank in the belief that excess liquidity would ultimately lead to inﬂation. Whenever the
Bank felt that M2-growth was excessive, it used its instruments to bring it down. Over
time we see two broad developments in the instruments used: the transition from direct
to indirect instruments and a gradual orientation to more market based instruments. Both
processes were intrinsically linked to the capital and credit market liberalization, which is
described below.
From July 1973 until November 1979, the Central Bank imposed a liquidity reserve
requirement system on banks. As the liquidity ratio increased nonetheless and the afore-
mentioned measure had undesirable side effects, the Bank decided to apply a net credit
restriction between May 1977 and June 1981. The percentage growth rate allowed varied
3Article 9(1) of De Bankwet 1948: “De Bank heeft tot taak de waarde van de Nederlandse geldeenheid
te reguleren op zodanige wijze als voor ’s lands welvaart het meest dienstig is, en daarbij die waarde zoveel
mogelijk te stabiliseren.”
4over time and also differed somewhat between banks. Consumptive credit was restricted
between April 1979 and March 1980.
In 1986 and 1987 there was a gentlemen’s agreement with commercial banks to limit
the growth of credit. Especially the limit in 1987, 2%, was tight. Note that at various other
times, there were discussions between the Central Bank and commercial banks. Due to
the small number of banks (four and after a merger three large banks had a market share of
well over 80%), a formal agreement was not always necessary to limit credit expansion.
Between 1987 and 1993, the Bank held a small portfolio of government bonds for
open market operations: it was used only once in March 1989. Between July 1989 and
April 1990, a monetary cash reserve (non-interest bearing) applied.
During the 1980s the liquidity ratio was gradually abandoned and during the 1990s
the bank only targeted exchange rates, not so much as a policy choice, but a necessity
after the capital market liberalizations of the1980s. It was simply impossible to continue
targeting both a ﬁxed exchange rate with Germany and the liquidity ratio, but the bank
for a long time paid lip service to targeting liquidity (several issues of the annual report
of DNB). The liquidity ratio is reported in ﬁgure 1(j) and illustrates this point.
2.4 Exchange rate
The Netherlands have a long history of aiming for exchange rate stability: the gold stan-
dard was only abandoned after all other countries had left the gold block in 1936, even
though unemployment was over 20% at the time. The ﬁrst bank president after the war,
Holtrop held an almost dogmatic aversion to realignments in the Bretton woods system,
in which the Guilder was effectively anchored to the dollar: revaluations of the German
mark were only partially followed.
When the system broke down, the Dutch government took the initiative and entered
into an agreement with Belgium and Luxembourg, ﬁxing exchange rates. A few month
later these countries entered the snake and later the Netherlands became one of the found-
ing members of the European Monetary System. In all these arrangements, the Dutch
Guilder was restricted to the smallest possible band. In the EMS, the Dutch Guilder was
devalued with respect to the German mark on 18 October 1976, 16 October 1978, 24
September 1979 and 21 March 1983. At each time it was devalued by 2% vis-a-vis the
German mark. Especially the last devaluation came as a surprise: despite the massive
government deﬁcit at the time and consistently higher inﬂation than in Germany, the in-
terest rate differential with Germany had been closed. The surprise devaluation of the
new center-right government re-opened the interest rate gap with Germany for about ﬁve
years, in which the government ran expensive deﬁcits.
Cumulative inﬂation since 1983 has been lower in the Netherlands than in Germany
and the 1983-peg was maintained afterwards without problems. After the signature of
the Maastricht treaty in 1991, drawn up by the Dutch government, which foresaw the
creation of a singly European currency on January 1st 1999 and in which the participation
of both Netherlands and Germany was never in doubt, turmoil broke out in the EMS:
After two waves of speculative attacks in 1992 and 1993 it effectively collapsed: all
bands were widened to 15%. Still the Dutch and German authorities immediately entered
into a bilateral agreement in August 1993 to maintain the old bands, which were never
challenged by the markets. Just before ﬁxing the Euro-exchange rates, the Guilder was
5markedly stronger than the Mark on speculation that it might be revalued. Wellink, the
president of the central bank since 1998, admitted afterwards that they had considered the
idea of a revaluation.4
2.5 Liberalization process
Already in 1961, current account transactions had been fully liberalized and foreign di-
rect investment was allowed virtually without restrictions. There never was a period of
really strict capital controls. Other capital account restrictions remained strict, but were
considerably simpliﬁed in 1977. In 1983 restrictions on capital inﬂows were abolished.
On January 1 1986, October 1 1986 and January 1 1988, the domestic capital market
was almost completely deregulated: among other things bullet loans, commercial paper,
ﬂoating rate notes and bank issues of certiﬁcate were allowed, as were deep discount
and zero-coupon bonds. Foreigners were also allowed to tap the market. In 1991 the
prohibition of indexed loans was ﬁnally abrogated.5
The abolition of a strict separation between banks and insurance companies on Jan-
uary11990quicklyledtoanumberofmergersandtake-overs, whichprofoundlychanged
the market structure: by the mid-1990s, three big ﬁnancial groups, ABN-Amro, ING and
the Rabobank controlled almost the entire banking market in the Netherlands. The ﬁrst
two are now rapidly expanding abroad. On the other hand a few insurance companies
entered the banking market, offering postal savings account at very competitive rates.
Due to the increased competition, banks and these insurance companies started offering
savings accounts with interest rates well above the money market rates. At the time of
writing this article, April 2003, large banks are offering 4% on instant saving accounts
and some smaller ones even 4.8%. Yet the yield curve on the money market (to one year)
is well below 2,75%, whereas the yield on 10 year government bonds is 4,2%. Interest
rates on saving accounts are thus effectively used to attract and maintain clients and to
entice them to buy other proﬁtable services from the bank.
3 Money demand, data and the Netherlands
In this section we shall discuss the literature on money demand in the Netherlands and the
data used in this paper.
3.1 Money demand in the Netherlands
The central question in the Dutch money demand literature of the last decade has been:
what is the cause of the rise in the liquidity ratio over the last twenty years.
From a monetarist point of view, excess money should ultimately lead to inﬂation,
which given the ﬁxed exchange rate over the period (and even more now in Euroland)
should be a real worry to policy makers.
4At the presentation of the annual report of the Dutch Central Bank over 1998, on May 25th 1999, he
admitted that the Dutch central bank had entertained the idea of a revaluation. They decided not to revalue
for fear of turbulence on the exchange rate market (see NRC Handelsblad, May 26 1999)
5Unfortunately no indexed bonds have been issued by the Dutch state so far, which means that real
interest rates will have to be approximated in the rest of this paper.
6A number of explanations have been put forward in the empirical literature: proﬁt
hoarding by ﬁrms, who are uncertain about the future (Kuipers and Boertje, 1988), an
increased importance of the ﬁnancial transactions motive (Sterken, 1992) and increased
wealth in the Dutch economy (Fase and Winder, 1990). All of these studies leave large
misspeciﬁcation in their estimated equations in the form of extremely low Durbin-Watson
statistics, a sign that the non-stationarity of the data has not been completely taken care
of.
The Dutch Central Bank decided to do a survey of ﬁrms in the late eighties to ﬁnd out
why they held more money. Only from the mid 1980s did the central bank record where
the liquidity increase took place. Large part of it was in the business sector and from the
survey they conclude that this is due to the preference for internal ﬁnancing over external
ﬁnancing in ﬁrms, which given the increased proﬁtability of the business sector, became
easier in the 1980s.
Jacobs and Van der Horst (1996) are from a methodological point of view closest to
this paper: they consider a small VAR model with the log of real GDP, annual inﬂation,
short and long term interest rates (but not money) and ﬁnd that the real long term interest
rate in the Netherlands in stationary over the period 1977(1)-1992(4).
3.2 Data vector
The data vector of this study is very similar to that used in a number of other studies,
namely Juselius (1998, 2001); Juselius and Toro (1999); Beyer (1998). It consists of
quarterly data on national income, money, a short term interest rate, a long term interest
rate and the quarterly inﬂation rate. The last four variables are daily averages (monthly
average in the case of money supply) over the whole quarter (and thus not end of quarter
data).
The log of real gross domestic product(according to ESA 1995 deﬁnitions and with
base year 1995) yt is supplied by the Dutch central statistical agency (CBS, available
on-line at statline: www.cbs.nl).
The log of nominal M3, m3t as supplied by the Dutch central bank was chosen, be-
cause it was not targeted over the period (a special Dutch deﬁnition of M2 was in the
beginning of the period under study) and it is the only broad measure for which data are
readily available for the whole period, as measurement of M2 stopped a few years earlier.
This measure was not targeted, but it appears subject to a large number of data revisions.
The log of the CPI with base year 1975 pt is supplied by the Dutch central statisti-
cal agency and has been taken from datastream. Unfortunately no chain weighted price
index is available and the GDP deﬂator for the statistical agency suffers from large data
problems6.
Ltit and stit are measures of long and short term interest rates respectively, each
divided by 400 to make them comparable to the quarterly inﬂation rate ∆pt = pt ¡ pt¡1.
Ltit is the interest rate on liquid7 Dutch government bonds with a remaining time to
6The GDP deﬂator supplied by the Central Statistical Ofﬁce(CBS) ﬂuctuates more than 5% per quarter
in the early 1980s. In other parts of the series no similar behaviour exists. The CBS explained they were
aware of the problem, caused by linking series, but had no idea of the causes or indeed how to ﬁx it.
7Trade has to take place in a certain bond and there is a minimal amount outstanding (source: CBS
statline)
7maturity between 5 and 8 years and has been taken from statline.
Stit is a measure of interest rates available on saving accounts and deposits of less
than two years: it has been constructed on purpose for this study by taking the daily
maximum over all such savings products of the postbank/rijkspost-girospaarbank/ING
and Spaarbeleg. The ﬁrst used to be the state-owned giro service at the post ofﬁce, was
privatized in the 1980s and became part of the ING group in the early 1990s. Throughout
the period it had a fairly constant and consistent market share. The latter is part of an
insurance company and aggressively entered the market with a postal savings account in
the 1990s. This interest is markedly different from short term interest rates on the money
markets. It is a good proxy measure for the savings rate available to households (and
some small companies) over the period. A gradual increase in competition lead to banks
offering interest rates to private consumers which were well above the money market
rate towards the end of the period. They did so to attract other more proﬁtable business.
Clearly not all companies did and do not have access to these saving rates.
The 5 data series, yt;m3t;pt;ltit and stit together with inﬂation ∆pt are plotted in
ﬁgures 1(a)-1(f). In ﬁgures 1(g)-1(j) we report 4 derived data series, namely the interest
rate differential idt = ltit ¡ stit, the real short run interest rate rstit = stit ¡ ∆pt, the
real supply of M3, m3rt = m3t ¡pt and the log liquidity ratio lrt = m3rt ¡pt. All these
four last variables play an important role in the theories, that will be tested in this paper.
Graph 1(g) shows that there is a decline in the interest rate spread over the period
and that there is one episode in 1993 of an inverted yield curve. The real short term
interest rate also declined in the last years of the sample. The growth in real M3 has been
phenomenal an has far outstripped the growth in real income, such that the liquidity ratio
increased considerable over the period under study.
4 Economic Theory
A host of economic theories predict constant relationships between the above mentioned
variables. The following discussion also purports to show which ones have found empir-
ical support in the empirical literature, which uses cointegrated VAR-models.
Money demand; md in its most general form is given by:
m
d
t = b1yt + b2pt + b3stit ¡ b4ltit ¡ b5∆pt + b6t + ut (1)
where all parameters, with the exception of b6, are assumed to be non-negative and ut is
stationary. Often unit price b2 and income b1 elasticities are imposed. These are of course
testable restrictions and will be treated as such. Furthermore b3 = b4 is often believed to
be necessary, as the differential should give a measure of the opportunity cost of holding
money. b6 is a fairly crude way of including a long liberalization process or alternatively
technological innovation.
Aggregate income. The standard IS relationship predicts that trend-adjusted real ag-
gregate income is negatively related to the real long term interest rate.
Alternatively trend-adjusted real income may cointegrate with inﬂation to yield a
short-run Phillips curve as in Hendry and Mizon (1993) or Juselius (1996). Both al-
ternatives are captured in the following relationship
yt = b1t ¡ b2ltit + b3∆pt + ut (2)
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(g) idt interest rate differential









(h) rstit real short term interest rate











(i) m3rt real M3 (m3t ¡ pt)












(j) Log liquidity ratio, lrt = m3t ¡ yt
Figure 1: The data series 9where b1 ¸ 0, ; b2 = b3 and ut » I(0) is consistent with an IS curve and b2 = 0 and
b3 > 0 speciﬁes a short-run Phillips curve.
Interest rate relations. According to the Fisher parity, the expected real interest rate is
a stationary process:
stit = Et(∆8pt+8)=8 + u1t (3)
(Here the yield curve is supposed to be increasing over the ﬁrst two years, such that
M3 yields the highest interest rate over 8 quarters). Unfortunately we cannot measure
expectations with the present data set, so we have to rely on the outcome. If we make the
auxiliary assumptions that:
u2t = Et(∆8pt+8)=8 ¡ ∆8pt+8=8 (4)
and :
u3t = Et(∆8pt+8)=8 ¡ ∆pt (5)
where u2t and u3t are stationary, just as u1t is, then we get:
rstit = stit ¡ ∆pt (6)
= u1t + u2t + u3t = ut (7)
which is easily testable, but of course heavilydependent on the two auxiliary assumptions.
Therefore a rejection does not imply a refutation of the Fisher parity.
The expectations hypothesis, augmented with the two auxiliary assumptions states
that the interest differential between long and short term interest rates is stationary:
idt = ltit ¡ stit = ut (8)
where ut is once more a stationary process.
Central bank policy rules. As the Central Bank targeted the exchange rate in a small
open economy with already very liberal capital restrictions in the beginning of the period,
it was able to inﬂuence neither the (short term) interest rate (which was set by Germany),
nor the money supply. We thus do not expect to ﬁnd a central bank policy rule.
Policy rules are found to yield stationary relationships by Beyer (1998) and Juselius
(2001), but in these two cases, the respective countries executed their independent mone-
tary policy.
Monetarist theories Textbook treatment of monetarist theories and also the Dutch
moderate monetarism framework assume that the liquidity ratio (or alternatively money
velocity, which is its inverse) is stationary:
lrt = m3t ¡ pt ¡ yt = ut (9)
Furthermore excess money will lead to inﬂation in the medium run and the central bank
is assumed to be able to control inﬂation by increasing the short term interest rates. The
last two statements are testable in the moving average representation of the I(1) model.
5 The statistical model
In this section we discuss the statistical models used together with some extra remarks on
particular outstanding issues.
105.1 The I(2) model
One representation of the p-dimensional I(2) model (Johansen, 1992) with 2 lags is given
by:
∆
2Xt = ΠXt¡1 ¡ Γ∆Xt¡1 + ¹0 + ¹1t + "t (10)
where "t is distributed normally with mean zero and variance-covariance matrix Ω
Deﬁne the characteristic polynomial of this process as:
z(¸) = ¸
2I ¡ (Π + 2I ¡ Γ)¸ ¡ (Γ ¡ I) (11)
and let ¸1;:::;¸2p be the roots of jz(¸)j = 0
The following assumptions apply:
I(2) a Π = ®¯0 where ® and ¯ are p £ r matrices of full column rank. r < p
I(2) b 2p¡2r¡s roots ¸ of the characteristic polynomial (11) equal one ¸ = 1. The other
2r+srootsaresmallerthanoneinabsolutevaluej¸j < 1. Letf¸¤
ig;i = 1;:::;2r+
s indicate the roots of the second group. It then follows that ®0
?Γ¯? = »´0 where »
and ´ are full rank matrices of dimension (p ¡ r) £ s. Another equivalent way of
stating this result is ¯ ®?®0
?Γ¯ ¯?¯0
? = ®1¯0
1 where ®1 and ¯1 are full rank matrices of
dimension p £ s, s < p ¡ r.
I(2) c ®0
2Θ¯2 where Θ = Γ¯ ¯¯ ®0Γ + I, ®2 = (® : ®1)? and ¯2 = (¯ : ¯1)? is a matrix of
full rank (p ¡ r ¡ s).
On the deterministics, we put restrictions to make sure that all variables have a trend
in the levels, but no quadratic or cubic trend. This implies that all the variables can be
decomposed in a stochastic part Yt and deterministic part as:
Xt = Yt + m1 + m2t (12)
The following particular speciﬁcation for the deterministic part of the I(2) model was
originally proposed by (Rahbek et al., 1999) .
I(2) t1 ¹1 = ®¯0





0, where ´0 is a vector of length p ¡ r ¡ s.
No restrictions are placed on ®0¹0.
A few comments on these conditions are warranted: If s = p ¡ r we are back at the
well known I(1) model, which is given below. Furthermore all unit roots are at 1 and
nowhere else: seasonal unit roots are not considered in this chapter.
The number of I(1) trends equals s, whereas the number of I(2) trends is p ¡ r ¡ s.
The advantage of this representation is that all the restrictions are explicitly introduced
in the standard VAR-model, one of the main workhorses of modern econometrics. A ma-
jor disadvantage is that the restrictions are very complicated and non-linear. Furthermore
the stationary relations are not obvious in this representation, so this representation does




































































Figure 2: Selection of ranks in the I(2) model
Another problem for the statistician is that no direct methods to explicitly maximize
thelikelihoodfunctionhavebeenderivedforthisrepresentation: itisdifﬁculttomaximize
a likelihood under these complicated linear restrictions. So following Paruolo and Rahbek
(1999) we reparametrize the model, such that conditions I(2)a, I(2)t1 and I(2)t2 become














0∆Xt¡1 + ¿2) + "t (13)
5.1.1 Determination of the rank in the I(2) model
In the I(2) model, we need to determine two ranks, namely r and s. We can maximize the
likelihood under the restrictions H0 : r = r0;s = s0 to obtain Lmax (H (r;s;p ¡ r ¡ s))
and form the likelihood ratio
Q(H (r;s;p ¡ r ¡ s)jH (p;0;0)) =
Lmax (H (r;s;p ¡ r ¡ s))
Lmax (H (p;0;0))
Under the null r = r0;s = s0 the test statistic ¡2lnQ(H (r;s;p ¡ r ¡ s)jH (p;0;0))
asymptoticallyconvergestoafunctionalofBrownianmotions, whichforthedeterministic
speciﬁcation in this paper has been tabulated by Rahbek et al. (1999). We start by testing
H (0;0;p). If rejected we test H (0;1;p ¡ 1) to H (0;p;0) and then test H (1;0;p ¡ 1)
as in ﬁgure 2. The grey column coincides with the standard I(1) rank tests. The number
of I(2) trends, p-r-s equals zero in that column.
Paruolo (1996) shows that this procedure has an asymptotic rejection probability of
5% if tests performed are 5% tests.
5.1.2 The two step procedure and maximum likelihood estimation
Two approaches have been proposed for the estimation of an I(2) system. Historically the
so-called two step procedure (Johansen, 1995c) preceded the full maximum likelihood
procedure (Johansen, 1997). Even though most applications so far have used the two step
procedure, we shall apply the maximum likelihood procedure, except for the estimation
of the rank, where we use both. Me2 (Omtzigt, 2003) is a computer package executing
the maximum likelihood procedure.
12For the determination of the cointegration ranks, we use the two step estimator as
Paruolo (1996) proves that the procedure in ﬁgure 2, based on the two step estimator
selects the correct integration indices with probability 95% (if 5% tests are used). To our
knowledge a similar proof for the maximum likelihood estimator is not available. We
shall however calculate the statistics for both procedures.
We shall only need to do inference on the parameters ¿ and ¿2 in equation (13). Jo-
hansen (2002b) derives conditions under which likelihood ratio tests on ¿ are asymptot-
ically Â2 distributed8. As little is known about the small sample properties of these tests
(and nothing is known on the asymptotic distribution of tests on ¿2), we shall also re-
sort to bootstrapping these tests. Small sample properties will be more fully discussed in
subsection 5.4.
5.2 The I(1) model
The p-dimensional vector autoregressive model with 2 lags can be represented in its re-
duced form as:
∆Xt = ®¯
0Xt¡1 + Γ1∆Xt¡1 + ¹0 + ¹1t + "t (14)
where "t are distributed N(0;Ω).
Deﬁne the characteristic polynomial of this process as:
z(¸) = ¸
2I ¡ (Π + I + Γ)¸ ¡ Γ (15)
and let ¸1;:::;¸2p be the roots of jz(¸)j = 0
The assumptions, which assure that the model is I(1) are:
I(1) a p ¡ r roots ¸ of the characteristic polynomial (15) equal one: ¸ = 1. The other
p+r roots are smaller than one in absolute value j¸j < 1. Let f¸¤
ig;i = 1;:::;p+r
indicate the roots of the second group.
I(1) b ® and ¯ are full rank p £ r matrices, r < p.
The following assumption is placed on the trend variable to assure that no quadratic
trend is generated in the data, but that all variables have a trend in their levels is:
I(1) t1 ®0
?¹1 = 0 or equivalently ¹1 = ®½0.
Inference in the I(1) model is thoroughly described in the monograph by Johansen
(1995b).
5.3 The nominal to real transformation (NtRT)
The I(2) model is a submodel of the I(1) model: it has the extra rank restriction I(2)c
imposedonit. InferenceintheI(2)modelinvolvesanumberofstillunknowndistributions
and maximum likelihood still has not been implemented for general restrictions. Hence
a transformation from the I(2) to the I(1) model is highly desirable. Kongsted (2002)
8The I(2) model of Johansen (2002b)does not have any deterministics. We shall assume that the results
will continue to hold true if these are included.
13proposes a testable transformation, in which no information is lost and calls it the nominal
to real transformation. The name suggest that the only nominal variables exhibit I(2)
behaviour and that it can be removed by subtracting an appropriate price index. This
holds true in many cases, but is not an absolute prerequisite, such that the name is slightly
misleading.
The transformation starts from the observation that (¿0Xt;¿0
?∆X) » I(1) or in fact
any transformation (¿0Xt;s0
?∆X) » I(1) for which js0
?¿?j 6= 0. So the proposed trans-
formation is to analyze (¿0Xt;s0
?∆X), which will be shown to have an autoregressive
structure and a reduced rank, such that it is an I(1) model.
We shall now derive the autoregressive representation of the new process after the













































































































?m2 should only contain a level intercept, but no trend, whereas
of course ¿0Xt = ¿0Yt + ¿0m1 + ¿0m2t should still contain a trend.
Sotokeepthemodelexactlythesameafterthetransformation, weshouldtakeaccount
of the following two facts:
1. The coefﬁcient to the second lag of s0
?∆2Xt¡1 are zero.
2. s0
?∆Xt should only contain an intercept, but no trend, whereas ¿0Xt should contain
a trend.
14Kongsted and Nielsen (2002) study the effect of ignoring the restrictions 1 and 2 in
a model which does not contain dummies, seasonal or otherwise. They do so by means
of an application on real data and a simulation study, both a 3-dimensional VAR and ﬁnd
that “unrestricted reduced rank regression is shown to yield only a minor loss of efﬁciency
compared to imposing the restrictions in the simulation experiment.” They thus argue to
transform the model to an I(1) model, ignoring the additional restrictions. They thus
transform the I(2) model (10) with restrictions I(2)a-c, I(2)t1-2 to the the I(1) model (10)
with restrictions I(1)a-b, I(1)t1.
5.4 Small sample properties of cointegrated VAR models
The small sample properties of most, if not all tests in the cointegrated VAR models (14)
and (10) have from the beginning given cause for concern. Most attention has focused
on the restrictions on the cointegration parameters ¯ in the I(1) model (14) (see Gonzalo
(1994)). Two methods to overcome severe size distortion in small samples have been
proposed and applied in the literature, namely Bartlett corrections and bootstrap methods.
We shall discuss the implementation of these methods in inference on the cointegration
parameters in the I(1) model and then give some comments on small sample properties of
the other tests.
Deﬁne ¯¤ = (¯;½)
0 and let us consider the general I(1) model (14) and the following
hypotheses on ¯ and ½:
1. ¯¤ = (¯¤
0;Ã) that is q · r out of the cointegration relationships are known entirely,
including their trend. The other cointegration relations are unknown.
2. ¯ = H', that is the same restriction on all cointegration vectors (but no restrictions
on the trend parameters).
3. ¯¤ = (H1';:::;Hr') that is generically identifying, linear restrictions on each of
the vectors ¯¤. If the restrictions are not generically identifying, the algorithm by
Omtzigt (2002b) can be used to render them identifying.
Johansen (2000) derives the Bartlett correction for tests 1 and 2 under an assumption
on the dummies, which in the current deterministic set-up implies that seasonal dummies
can be taken account of, but other dummies not. By means of a Monte Carlo study he
shows that the Bartlett corrected test has a size close to 5%.
Gredenhoff and Jacobson (2001) propose to bootstrap all three kinds of tests and do
so in a small Monte Carlo study. This method can also be applied if besides seasonal
dummies, other dummies are present in the model. They base their bootstrap on the
estimate of ¯¤ under the null hypothesis and show by means of a simulation study that the
size properties of the bootstrapped test are adequate.
Omtzigt and Fachin (2002) show that both methods can fail in terms of power. They
argue that if the null null hypothesis is false, then the estimated model under the (false)
null hypothesis does not contain p ¡ r unit roots, but (at least) p ¡ r + 1 unit roots,
as (at least) one of the cointegration relations becomes non-stationary. If the estimated
(p ¡ r + 1)th unit root is close to unity, the Bartlett correction factor grows without bound
(and becomes undeﬁned when it is unity). Consequently the Bartlett corrected likelihood
15ratio test statistic becomes very small and the null hypothesis is wrongly accepted. By
means of simulations they show that the corrected likelihood ratio can well become a
biased test, as can the bootstrapped test statistic.
Let ˆ µr =
³
ˆ ¯r; ˆ ½r; ˆ ®r; ˆ Γ1r; ˆ Ωr
´
betheestimatesunderH0 and ˆ µu =
³
ˆ ¯u; ˆ ½u; ˆ ®u; ˆ Γ1u; ˆ Ωu
´
the estimates under the alternative. Then Omtzigt and Fachin (2002) propose to base the
Bartlett correction on ˆ µu. They also suggest ressampling from the DGP based on ˆ µu (and
not ˆ µr) when applying the bootstrap. H0 does not neccisarily hold in the bootstrap sam-
ple, so propose to take a new null hypothesis H
\
0 which holds in the bootstrap sample en
equals H0 if H0 were to hold true in that sample. They propose H
\
0 for the cases 1 and 2,
but not for the more frequently applied case 3. In the appendix to this chapter, section A
we give one proposal for H
\
0 in case 3.
As a general point we shall report j¸¤
maxj, that is the the largest root, that is not re-
stricted to be unity by the model. If j¸¤
maxj is substantially larger in the restricted model
(and close to unity) than in the unrestricted model, then we consider that a sign that H0
should be rejected. The points raised by Omtzigt and Fachin (2002) are then amply illus-
trated, as the both the bootstrap and the Bartlett correction cease to function, when j¸¤
maxj
is close to unity. If this is not the case there are no substantial differences between basing
the Bartlett correction or bootstrap on the unrestricted estimates.
The asymptotic theory for parameters in the I(2) model has only just been developed
and not even for all the tests on ¿ and ¿2 we perform do we know the asymptotic distribu-
tion. So the small sample properties of the estimators are still very much unknown. We
therefore bootstrap these tests. The point raised above on the extra unit root(s) is equally
valid, but we still bootstrap using the restricted parameter estimates, as we do not have
any equivalent null hypotheses for the bootstrap. We do however report the largest root
in both the restricted and unrestricted model and note that in the test we perform they are
extremely close, such that even with an equivalent hypothesis we are conﬁdent that we
would obtain very much the same results.
The Bartlett correction of Johansen (2002a) for the trace test in the I(1) model is not
valid in the presence of seasonal dummies, which are present in our application. Sub-
sequently we cannot use the correction. An alternative would be to block-bootstrap the
residuals and resample under the null as proposed by Van Giersbergen (1996). Yet the
length of the block makes a large difference and no clear guidance as to how to select the
block length is available.
Two issues are of interest in the rank selection procedure. In the I(2) model the differ-
ences between rank selection based on maximum likelihood and rank selection based on
the 2 step method has not been commented upon, so we compare the two.
Secondly if we were to apply a nominal-to-real transformation and impose the restric-
tions 1, 2 in subsection 5.4,if no dummies were present and if we were to use the unre-
stricted estimate of ¿, then the trace statistic for the rank in the I(2) model
Lmax(H(r;0;p¡r))
Lmax(H(p;0;0))
and the trace test in the I(1) model
Lmax(H(r))
Lmax(H(p)) would be the same. We shall ﬁnd that ignor-
ing these conditions will cause them to be quite different: we use a restricted estimate of
¿, seasonal dummies are present in the model and we do not impose the two restrictions
in subsection 5.4.
165.5 Automated Model Selection
The identiﬁcation and restriction of the cointegration space in the I(1) model is a long
and fairly arduous process. Following Davidson (1998) who ﬁrst automates the search
for restrictions, Omtzigt (2002a) proposes a procedure for restriction and identiﬁcation,
which mimics the way Juselius (2002) searches for cointegration vectors.
If there is only one cointegration vector, the search procedure is as follows:
1. The program creates p + 1 unit vectors h1;:::;hp+1, corresponding to the p vari-
ables and the trend in ¯¤. The user can specify additional vectors ei;i = 1;:::;u.
If the ﬁrst two variables are money and income, then the user may deﬁne e =
[1;¡1;0;:::;0]
0 which can be seen as the ’new’ variable m ¡ y. The program
takes any possible combination of maximal p of the vectors h1;:::;hp+1;e;:::;eu
and forms the matrices H1 through to HK all of full column rank. For each i 6=
j;sp(Hi) 6= sp(Hj) and the matrix which only consists of column hp+1 (and would
thus correspond to testing whether the trend is a stationary relation) is excluded.
2. The programs tests restrictions of the kind ¯¤ = HvÁv. All those accepted at the 5%
level are listed. First the accepted tests with the highest number of over-identifying
restrictions (that is with the lowest number of columns in H) are reported. In case
of an equal number of over-identifying restrictions, the test with the highest p-value
is reported ﬁrst.
If the rank of the cointegration matrix is 2, then the matrices H in step 1 contain at
most p ¡ 1 columns. In step 2, we ﬁrst test all the individual restrictions of the form
¯¤ = (HvÁv;Ã). Those accepted at the 1% level are then combined in a further step. Let
C1 = f1;:::c1g denote the set of accepted restrictions. We then test each combination
i;j 2 C1;i 6= j for which the restrictions are generically identifying. We thus test ¯¤ =
(Hi';Hj') Let C2 = ffi;jgl ;l = 1;:::;c2g deﬁne the set of combined restrictions that
are accepted at the 5% level. Then order all the restrictions in C1, which are accepted at
the 5% level and those in C2 according to the criteria above.
A more detailed account of the procedure can be found in Omtzigt (2002a), who also
performs a Monte Carlo study to test the effectiveness of the procedure. He argues that the
researchershouldchosebetweenthetop-5modelsselectedandshowsthatunder-selection
of the lag length leads to a higher probability of recovering the true model.
Even though his simulations show that there is a sizeable size distortion in the proce-
dures, he does not use any corrections (Bartlett or bootstrap) in his Monte Carlo simula-
tions. In this paper we combine automated model search with small sample corrections to
gauge whether the resulting procedure is useful for the data set at hand.
6 The empirical analysis
Even though data is available from 1977 quarter 1 (the start of the GDP data series), we
effectively use data from 1979 ﬁrst quarter onwards, as 1977 and 1978 contain a series of
outliers, which would require a number of dummies.
Instead of modelling straight away the ﬁve data series, we choose to model the fol-
lowing transformation: yt, pt, m3t;rstit and idt. All these variables are plotted in ﬁgure
17Misspeciﬁcation tests in the unrestricted VAR
Univariate Multivariate
Variable y99t pt m3t rsrit idt
Normality 1:96(0:38) 2:64(0:27) 0:25(0:88) 4:22(0:12) 1:51(0:47) 11:63(0:31)
AR1 0:03(0:87) 0:03(0:85) 0:01(0:91) 0:06(0:81) 0:55(0:46) 25:08(0:46)
skewness 0:36 ¡0:25 ¡0:02 0:37 ¡0:08
kurtosis 3:18 3:50 2:95 3:79 3:30
Table 1: Misspeciﬁcation tests of the unrestricted VAR with two lags
1. We needed exactly two lags and centered seasonal dummies, but no other dummies.
The residuals of the unrestricted VAR with two lags show no sign of misspeciﬁcation, see
table 1. The normality and AR1 tests have been taken from Doornik and Hansen (1994)
and Doornik (1996) respectively. The p-values between brackets indicate that the model
is well speciﬁed.
6.1 Determination of rank in the I(2) model
The determination of the ranks in the I(2) model is done as described in section 5.1.1.
We have calculated the relevant likelihood ratio statistics based on the 2 step estimator
and those based on the maximum likelihood estimator. They are reported in tables 2 and
3. The 95% percentile of the asymptotic distribution is given in brackets below the test
statistics: we remark once more that we have no formal proof that these percentiles are
valid for the maximum likelihood estimator.
From a theoretical point of view we expect there to be just one I(2) trend, which is the
nominal trend in m3t and pt. Using table 2 the ﬁrst accepted rank is (r;s;p ¡ r ¡ s) =
(1;3;1). According to Paruolo (1996) we should now stop and accept this rank.
Wedohowevercontinueandﬁndthatthenexthypothesisacceptedis(r;s;p ¡ r ¡ s) =
(2;2;1): from a theoretical perspective we expect at least two cointegration relations to
be present in the data set. Furthermore the rank (r;s;p ¡ r ¡ s) = (1;3;1) was only just
accepted.
We note that 2 step estimation and maximum likelihood give identical results when
r = 0 and when p ¡ r ¡ s = 0: these are the top row and the right hand column in the
rank tables. In all other cases the statistic based on maximum likelihood is remarkably
lower than the statistic based on the two step estimator.
For two reasons shall we continue to do the rest of the analysis for (r;s;p ¡ r ¡ s) =
(1;3;1). Firstly it is the ﬁrst rank accepted in both procedures. Secondly and more
importantly, it turns out that using inference from r = 1 is beneﬁcial for r = 2.
6.2 The nominal to real transformation(s)
The aim of this section is to fully determine ¿, for once we have done so, we can apply the
nominal to real transformation and continue our analysis in the I(1) model. ¿0Xt contains
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p ¡ r ¡ s 5 4 3 2 1 0
Table 2: Test statistics of the rank selection procedure, based on two step estimation
Maximum Likelihood Inference









































p ¡ r ¡ s 5 4 3 2 1 0
Table 3: Test statistics of the rank selection procedure, based on maximum likelihood
estimation
19The nominal to real transformation
(r;s;p ¡ r ¡ s) I(1) with trend I(1) without trend j¸¤
maxj LR test BS p-value
(1;3;1) 0:55
yt;m3t ¡ 0:1pt;idt;rstit 0:63 9:29(0:03) 0:11
yt;m3t ¡ pt;idt;rstit 0:58 16:26(0:00) 0:03
yt;m3t ¡ pt idt;rstit 0:60 17:07 0:08
(2;2;1) 0:76
yt;m3t ¡ 0:8pt;idt;rstit 0:79 7:67(0:05) 0:18
yt;m3t ¡ pt;idt;rstit 0:80 7:97(0:09) 0:29
yt;m3t ¡ pt idt;rstit 0:80 8:88 0:51
Table 4: Testing the nominal to real transformation for r=1 (top) and r=2 (bottom)
all the variables and combinations of variables that are at most I(1). The variables are
Xt = (yt;mt;pt;rstit;idt): real GDP, m3, the consumer price index, the real short term
interest rate and the interest rate differential between the nominal long term interest rate
and the nominal short term interest rate. Let h1 be the ﬁve-dimensional unit vector with 1
as the ﬁrst element and e1 = [0;1;¡1;0;0].
In the unrestricted I(2) model with ranks (r;s;p ¡ r ¡ s) = (1;3;1) the largest root
of the characteristic polynomial that is not restricted to 1 equals 0:55 in absolute value, see
table 4, where we report the outcome of the tests on ¿. The test that ¿ = [h1;h4;h5;Ã],
where Ã varies freely. This hypothesis implies that that yt, rstit and idt are (at most)
I(1) variables with a linear trend, and that mt and pt share the same I(2) trend, but that
this trend does not feed proportionally into both variables. It takes a value of 9:82. Since
under the null hypothesis this test has a Â2-distribution with 3 degrees of freedom, its p-
value is 0:03 and the test is rejected. We note that the maximum root of the characteristic
polynomial is 0:63 and thus close to 0:56 and bootstrap the test statistic to ﬁnd that the
hypothesis is accepted with a p-value of 0:11. The bootstrap procedure has been based
on the restricted estimate (and not on the unrestricted estimate as argued before) of the
parameters. Yet we shall see later, when testing in the I(1) model, that there may not be a
large difference when j¸¤
maxj does not increase too much.
The next hypothesis ¿ = [h1;h4;h5;e1], which implies that the I(2)-trend feeds pro-
portionally into money and prices, is just rejected with a bootstrapped p-value of 0:03.
The test that ¿ = [h1;h4;h5;e1];¿2 = [¤;0;0;¤], which implies that idt and rstit are
at most I(1), but do not contain a linear trend is accepted with a p-value of 0:08. Note that
Johansen (2002b) does not report the asymptotic distribution for this latest test, such that
we can only report the p-value of the bootstrapped test statistic.
For the choice (r;s;p ¡ r ¡ s) = (2;2;1) all three hypotheses are accepted with
relatively large bootstrapped p-values and j¸¤
maxj does not increase much in the restricted
models.
We thus conclude that the nominal to real transformation, where the I(2) trend feeds
proportionally into money and prices is accepted for both choices of ranks.
We accept the transformation for both choices of ranks and proceed with an I(1)-
analysis of the transformed data vector Xt = [yt;m3rt;idt;rstit;∆pt], where m3rt =
m3t ¡ pt.
20After transformation I(2) model
Trace 95% Lmax 95% Trace Lmax
r = 0 90:3 87:0 39:8 24:8 109:4 45:6
r = 1 50:5 62:2 21:8 20:0 63:8 36:7
r = 2 28:6 42:2 16:1 16:7 27:1 13:8
r = 3 12:6 25:5 10:1 13:1 13:3 11:2
r = 4 2:5 12:4 2:5 12:4 2:1 2:1
Table 5: Comparison of the rank tests in the I(1) and the I(2) model
6.3 Rank tables after NtR transformation
After the transformation, where following Kongsted and Nielsen (2002) we do not impose
the restrictions 1 and 2 on page 14 on the transformed systems, we obtain the trace and
Lmax statistics in table 5.(Note that additional differences are caused by the inclusion
of seasonal dummies in both the I(2) and I(1) model). For comparison we also report
the original statistics from the untransformed I(2) model from table 5. We see that if
we use the trace statistic, then we accept r = 1, whereas in the I(2) model we would
have accepted r = 2. Yet is were to use the Lmax statistic, both before and after the
transformation, the choice would be r = 2. We thus continue with both choices of rank.
In general the differences between the test statistics are substantial and thus ignoring the
additional restrictions does make a large difference in this data set.
6.4 Hypothesis testing on individual vectors
6.4.1 Hypothesis testing for r=1
Under the assumption that r = 1, we test a number of hypotheses on the cointegration
space ¯. Since the all the restrictions are of the type ¯ = HÁ and only seasonal dummies
are present, we can apply the Bartlett correction to these tests. We report the uncorrected
LR-test statistic (with p-value underneath between brackets) and two Bartlett corrected
LR-tests: the one based on the unrestricted estimates (only r = 1 is imposed) and the
restricted estimates. We shall base our decisions on the Bartlett corrected LR-test, which
is based on the unrestricted estimate.
H1 ¡ H5 are tests whether individual variables are trend-stationary. All these are
soundly rejected. In H6 ¡ H9 we test whether respectively the log-velocity (yt ¡ m3rt),
the real long term interest rate (rltit = ltit ¡ ∆pt), the nominal short term interest rate
or the nominal long term interest rate are stationary. Once more all these hypotheses are
rejected. With H10 we reject that any combination between yt and m3rt is stationary,
whereas H11 rejects any stationary relationship among the interest rates and inﬂation. We
conclude that the stationary relation is thus a combination of yt and m3rt on the one hand
and interest rates and inﬂation on the other. This means either a money demand relation
or an aggregate income relation. H12 ¡ H14 are different forms of money demand. H13
is the accepted relation with the largest number of restrictions (3) and is a special case of
the money demand equation (1) with b1 = b2 = 1;b3 = b5 and b4 = 0. In H15 ¡ H18 we
test different forms of aggregate income relations (2) (in H15 the coefﬁcient on m3r is
estimated freely, but equals zero) and ﬁnd that H17, an IS curve (a relation between real
21Restricted estimates of ¯ . Unrestricted es Restricted es
y m3r rsti id ∆p 1000t dof LR test BF LR test BF LR test j¸¤
maxj






























































































































Table 6: Tests in model with r=1 and 2 lags. All tests are Bartlett corrected in two ways:
once the Bartlett factor is based on the unrestricted estimates and the second time it is
based on the restricted estimates. For the unrestricted estimate j¸¤
maxj = 0:51.
income and the real long term interest rate) and H18, a short run Phillips curve are both
accepted.
We conclude that of the hypotheses considered, we can accept either of H13;H17 and
H18.
All Bartlett corrections are deﬁned, whether they are based on the unrestricted or
the restricted estimators, as the maximum unrestricted eigenvalue of the characteristic
polynomial(15) neverexceedsoneinabsolutevalue. Yetwenotethatthetwohypotheses,
that are most strongly rejected, H2 and H6 are accepted, when the Bartlett correction is
based on the restricted estimators. Their j¸¤
maxj is very close to unity, such that the Bartlett
factor is extremely large. This further corroborates the point on power raised in this paper.
226.4.2 Hypothesis testing for r=2
For r = 2, we ﬁrst consider hypotheses of the kind ¯¤ = (H1';Ã). No Bartlett correction
has yet been derived for them, so we bootstrap the test statistics. Once again we have the
choice of basing the bootstrap on the unrestricted estimate and the restricted estimate.
To base the bootstrap on the unrestricted estimate, we need to formulate an alterna-
tive null hypothesis, which is satisﬁed by the bootstrap sample. The construction of the
alternative hypothesis is given in the appendix of this paper.
We test 37 hypothesis on one of the two vectors (leaving the other unrestricted) and
calculate the three corresponding p-values. The results are reported in table 7. The last
row of the table contains j¸¤
maxj. The Bartlett correction is not deﬁned, when j¸¤
maxj ¸
1, but from a computational point of view, the bootstrap can be applied. We base our
conclusions on the bootstrapped p-value that is based on the unrestricted estimate.
H1 ¡ H9 are tests that exactly one of the variables is stationary, whereas H10 ¡ H18
are the corresponding tests for trend-stationarity. H19 is a test for trend-stationarity of
velocity without imposing equal coefﬁcients on real money and prices. H20 ¡ H27 are
tests on the stationarity of combinations of interest rates and inﬂation, H28 ¡ H31 are
hypotheses, corresponding to an aggregate demand curve and H32 ¡ H37 hypotheses on
a money demand relationship.
The bootstrap based on the restricted estimate accepts all 37 hypotheses, which means
the procedure does not have any discriminatory power in this context. The uncorrected
likelihood ratio test accepts 10 hypotheses, whereas the bootstrap based on the unre-
stricted estimate accepts 25 hypotheses, among whom ﬁve out of H10 ¡ H18. Under the
assumption that r = 2, at most two of them can hold true as each of these 9 hypoth-
esis concerned test that one variable or a predeﬁned linear combination of two or three
variables is stationary.
Combining two hypotheses at a time out of the 25 accepted, we ﬁnd that 145 out of
228 possible combinations of restrictions, which are generically identifying, are accepted.
The one with the largest number of over-identifying restrictions accepted is H5 + H10.
Yet the large number of accepted hypotheses indicates that the bootstrapped test has got
relatively little discriminatory power.
We have executed a model search as described in section 5.5 with one exception: we
have selected only a handful of hypotheses and certainly not every combination of unit
vectors H1 ¡ H5 and additional vectors H6 ¡ H9. Yet the large number of accepted
hypotheses in table 7 and the computer intensity of the bootstrap would make a full boot-
strappedsearchcostlyintermsofcomputingtime. Furthermoreeveninthislimitedsearch
large numbers of mutually exclusive models were accepted, leading to the conclusion that
for the data set at hand, basing the ﬁnal speciﬁcation on a bootstrapped automated model
search is not the way to proceed.
6.5 Automated Model Selection
Bearing in mind the apparent failure of (semi-)automated model selection, based on the
bootstrapped test statistics, we proceed with a full automatic model search, based on H1¡
H9 (fouruserspeciﬁedvariables). ThatiswiththedatavectorXt = [yt;m3rt;idt;rstit;∆pt],
we deﬁne the following search directions e1 = [1;¡1;0;0;0];e2 = [0;0;1;1;0];e3 =
[0;0;1;1;1] and e4 = [0;0;1;0;1], which correspond to the log-velocity, the long term
23Restricted estimates of ¯ P-values
y m3r rsi id ∆p 1000t dof LR test LR BS(un) BS(res) j¸¤
maxj
H1 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 19:24 0:00 0:01 0:46 1:009
H2 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 18:27 0:00 0:02 0:41 1:000
H3 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 16:65 0:00 0:02 0:26 0:903
H4 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 14:92 0:00 0:05 0:36 0:824
H5 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 7:30 0:12 0:48 0:72 0:870
H6 1 ¡1 0 0 0 0 4 17:12 0:00 0:02 0:38 0:983
H7 0 0 1 1 0 0 4 19:62 0:00 0:00 0:20 0:930
H8 0 0 1 1 1 0 4 11:64 0:02 0:15 0:57 0:941
H9 0 0 1 0 1 0 4 11:55 0:02 0:26 0:53 0:929
H10 1 0 0 0 0 ¡6:73 3 8:23 0:04 0:22 0:54 0:898
H11 0 1 0 0 0 ¡12:34 3 15:23 0:00 0:04 0:23 0:954
H12 0 0 1 0 0 0:11 3 13:21 0:00 0:03 0:29 0:918
H13 0 0 0 1 0 0:05 3 12:46 0:01 0:07 0:29 0:760
H14 0 0 0 0 1 0:02 3 7:13 0:07 0:39 0:59 0:849
H15 1 ¡1 0 0 0 1:69 3 17:05 0:00 0:02 0:18 0:972
H16 0 0 1 1 0 0:14 3 12:57 0:01 0:03 0:29 0:916
H17 0 0 1 1 1 0:12 3 7:46 0:06 0:24 0:49 0:722
H18 0 0 1 0 1 0:06 3 10:63 0:01 0:21 0:41 0:865
H19 1 0:12 0 0 0 ¡8:01 2 7:95 0:02 0:11 0:32 0:899
H20 0 0 1 ¡2:59 0 0 3 13:54 0:00 0:02 0:23 0:826
H21 0 0 1 3:52 0 0:25 2 11:77 0:00 0:01 0:12 0:828
H22 0 0 1 0 23:03 0 3 7:27 0:06 0:38 0:56 0:872
H23 0 0 1 0 4:31 0:15 2 6:91 0:03 0:24 0:33 0:845
H24 0 0 0 1 3:35 0 3 7:20 0:07 0:32 0:56 0:872
H25 0 0 0 1 1:01 0:07 2 6:42 0:04 0:24 0:40 0:798
H26 0 0 1 3:55 12:21 0 2 7:18 0:03 0:24 0:34 0:875
H27 0 0 1 2:30 1:65 0:20 1 4:87 0:03 0:19 0:21 0:704
H28 1 0 1:15 1:15 ¡5:18 ¡6:65 1 0:30 0:59 0:70 0:66 0:662
H29 1 0 4:75 4:75 0 ¡6:20 2 6:51 0:04 0:14 0:29 0:858
H30 1 0 0 0 ¡6:06 ¡6:79 2 0:49 0:78 0:89 0:89 0:676
H31 1 0:02 0 0 ¡6:10 ¡7:00 1 0:46 0:50 0:68 0:63 0:674
H32 1 ¡1 0 0 ¡60:83 2:18 2 7:16 0:03 0:24 0:34 0:839
H33 1 ¡0:49 8:58 0 0 ¡0:78 1 0:80 0:37 0:51 0:48 0:651
H34 1 ¡1 15:24 0 0 5:18 2 5:04 0:08 0:21 0:30 0:818
H35 1 ¡1 17:44 0 6:13 5:55 1 0:24 0:62 0:75 0:73 0:633
H36 1 0:40 0 16:61 0 ¡10:39 1 4:98 0:03 0:09 0:23 0:827
H37 1 ¡1 0 ¡69:44 0 1:20 2 11:42 0:00 0:02 0:15 0:744
Table 7: Tests on a single cointegration vector in model with r = 2 and 2 lags. All tests
are Bartlett corrected in two ways: once the Bartlett factor is based on the unrestricted
estimates and the second time it is based on the restricted estimates. For the unrestricted
estimate j¸¤
maxj = 0:642
24Model Nr Res LR P value y m3r rsti id ∆p trend
M1 3 1:14 0:767 1 ¡0:55 9:26 0 0 0
M2 3 6:47 0:091 1 ¡0:52 9:90 9:90 0 0
M3 3 7:03 0:071 1 ¡1 15:06 0 0 0:0050
M3e1 3 8:35 0:039 1 0 0 0 ¡5:83 ¡0:0067
M3e2 3 9:78 0:021 1 0 7:12 7:12 0 ¡0:0059
M4 2 0:62 0:733 1 ¡0:54 10:03 1:15 1:15 0
M5 2 0:82 0:662 1 ¡0:48 8:53 0 0 ¡0:0008
Table 8: Automated model selection with r = 1 and 2 lags
real interest rate, the long term nominal interest rate and the short term nominal interest
rate respectively.
We run the algorithm for both r = 1 and r = 2, and base our decisions on the
asymptotic LR-tests, uncorrected for small sample properties.
6.5.1 Rank = 1, 2 Lags
We report the ﬁrst ﬁve models M1 ¡ M5 from the automated model selection in table
8. We also add the two models, which we accepted previously (after Bartlett correction)
in subsection 6.4.1: they were the ﬁrst two models rejected after M3 as their p-value is
below 0.05.
Theﬁrst twomodels aredifﬁculttoaccept, sobased onthe automated modelselection,
we choose M3, a money demand relationship. This corresponds to H13 in table 6. M3e1
and M3e2 are H18 and H17 in the aforementioned table.
6.5.2 Rank = 2 and two lags
With rank=2 and two lags, we obtain the models in table 9. We note that the 71th accepted
model is the combination of the restrictions implied by M3 and M3e2 in table 8. In gen-
eral we see that models with a large number of over-identifying restrictions are accepted.
Each accepted relation has more restrictions that those that are accepted in the model with
rank 1.
6.5.3 Rank = 2 and 1 lag
Omtzigt (2002a) noted in a Monte Carlo study that when under-selecting the true lag
length, one had a greater chance of recovering the right restrictions: we therefore run the
automated model selection procedure with just one lag and note that while M1 and M2
are non-interpretable in the light of economic theory outlined earlier in the paper, M2e2
in table 10 corresponds to M71 in table 9. We select this as our ﬁnal model.
6.6 Selected model
The estimated model is thus a combination of a money demand equation (which is exactly
the equation selected, when r=1), depicted in ﬁgures 3(c)-3(d) and an IS-curve depicted
in ﬁgures 3(a)-3(b). The last one The IS curve clearly shows the large disequilibrium
25Model Nr Res LR P value y m3r rsti id ∆p trend
M1 6 8:42 0:209 0 0 0 0 1 0
1 ¡0:55 9:72 0 9:72 0
M2 6 10:76 0:096 0 0 0 0 1 0
1 ¡1 17:17 0 17:17 0:0054
M3 6 12:08 0:060 0 0 0 0 1 0
1 ¡0:50 11:36 11:36 11:36 0
M4 6 12:29 0:056 0 0 1 1 1 0
1 ¡0:55 9:02 0 0 0
M5 6 12:52 0:051 0 0 1 0 1 0
1 ¡0:55 0 0 ¡9:18 0
M65 4 6:21 0:184 1 ¡1 14:92 0 0 0:0051
1 0 0 0 ¡6:16 ¡0:0068
M71 4 6:99 0:136 1 ¡1 15:27 0 1 0:0053
1 0 3:66 3:66 0 ¡0:0063
Table 9: Automated Model Selection with r = 2 and 2 lags
Model Nr Res LR P value y m3r rsti id ∆p trend
M1 4 6:24 0:182 1 ¡0:48 14:87 14:87 0 0
0 1 ¡17:65 0 0 ¡0:0117
M2 4 8:73 0:068 1 ¡0:52 17:03 0 0 0
1 0 9:04 9:04 0 ¡0:0057
M2e2 4 9:62 0:047 1 ¡1 32:70 0 0 0:0058
1 0 11:40 11:40 0 ¡0:0056
M2e26 4 18:51 0:001 1 ¡1 16:85 0 0 0:0053
1 0 0 0 ¡5:03 ¡0:0067
M3 3 1:52 0:678 1 ¡1 20:73 0 0 ¡0:0054
1 0 5:15 8:21 ¡3:06 ¡0:0061
M4 3 2:17 0:537 1 ¡0:54 12:66 0 0 0
1 0 4:84 7:03 ¡2:19 ¡0:0061
M5 3 2:30 0:513 1 ¡0:49 13:52 13:52 0 0
0 1 ¡16:95 0 ¡3:95 ¡0:0119
Table 10: Automated Model Selection with r = 2 and 1 lag
26(recession) the Netherlands faced in the beginning of the period and a smaller one in the
early 1990s. The money demand relations is far more stable. The only disequilibrium
coincides with the only serious policy intervention in 1986-87, when there was a gentle-
men’s agreement with the Dutch banks to limit credit expansion. It is probably somewhat
surprising that it only depends on the own return on money, namely the real short run in-
terest rate. Different groups faced rather different interest rate (the market rate for ﬁrms,
but a higher rate for small savers), which makes ﬁnding this stable relation even more re-
markable. The trend is also very important (2.1 percent autonomous growth a year in the
real money supply). It is most likely a consequence of the gradual liberalization process.
7 Conclusions
We have studied money demand in the Netherlands in the 1980s and 1990s and modelled
it by means of a cointegrated VAR. We found a stable money demand function, which
only depends on the own interest rate, not on rates of return on other ﬁnancial assets
considered. With all the shocks and fundamental changes in the economy over the period,
this is fairly remarkable.
In modelling the VAR we have applied full maximum likelihood in the I(2) model and
found that substantial differences exist between the two step procedure and maximum
likelihood for the selection of the rank in the I(2) model. Furthermore ignoring the re-
strictions of the I(2) model in the I(1) after the nominal to real transformation, does make
a large difference.
On the methodology used, we make two points. Firstly the largest stationary root
in the characteristic polynomial is very important. If it grows large, then that is a sure
sign of misspeciﬁcation of the model, but contemporaneously makes the small sample
corrections (bootstrap and Bartlett corrections) fail miserably, if they are based on the
unrestricted estimate. Secondly in selecting the rank of the model, we have selected r=2
in the I(1) model, but for identiﬁcation, we have used the information from automated
model selection with r=1 and 2 lags as well as r=2 and 1 lag. There is no theory yet on
the asymptotic distribution of the tests, when the rank and/or lag length are deliberately
under-selected and this will be a fruitful alley for further research.
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A Equivalent hypotheses
In this appendix we propose a solution for the following problem:
A.1 problem
We have the null hypothesis of linear within-equation restrictions9
H0 : ¯ = (H1'1;:::;Hr'r) (16)
where the matrices H1;:::;Hr are generically identifying in the sense deﬁned by Jo-
hansen(1995a). (Iftheydonot, renderthemgenericallyidentifying, seeOmtzigt(2002b)).
Let matrix Hi possess si columns.
We have an unrestricted estimate of ¯; ˆ ¯u, which does not (necessarily) satisfy the
restrictions implied by (16) and need to ﬁnd an alternative null hypothesis H
\





, which is satisﬁed by ˆ ¯u and equals the restrictions implied by (16)
if ˆ ¯u satisﬁes those restrictions.
Subsequently in the bootstrap we can resample from ˆ ¯u and impose the new null
hypothesis H
\
0, see Omtzigt and Fachin (2002).
A.2 solution
We need to rotate the space such that each of the r vectors is as close as possible to its
















¯ i = 1;:::;r
with r ordered rows of r eigenvalues each ¹i;1 ¸ ¹i;2 ¸ ::: ¸ ¹i;r ¸ 0 and corresponding
r sets of eigenvectors (vi;1;:::;vi;r). Then let
˜ ¯i = ˆ ¯uvi;1 i = 1;:::;r
such that ˜ ¯ =
³
˜ ¯i;:::; ˜ ¯r
´
is the ordered unrestricted estimate.




















¯ i = 1;:::;r
9We take away the star from ¯¤ in the main text to avoid clutter in notation.
31with r ordered rows of si eigenvalues each ·i;1 ¸ ·i;2 ¸ ::: ¸ ·i;si ¸ 0 and correspond-
ing r sets of eigenvectors (wi;1;:::;wi;si).








In the last step we have taken the the s ¡ 1 columns of Hi which are as close to the
null space of ˜ ¯i as possible. The reason for which we take these is that if Hi is exactly
identifying on a column, then ˜ ¯i 2 sp(Hi) and thus ˜ ¯i = Hiwi;si. If we were then to
include the Hiwi;si we would have that ˜ Hi is no longer of full column rank.







. The new restrictions then read
˜ H
¤
i i = 1;:::;r
and are satisﬁed by the unrestricted estimate ˜ ¯.
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